

# Country Ownership in International Development Toward a Working Definition

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MEASURE Evaluation

**May 2016**

WP-16-164



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This publication was produced with the support of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) under the terms of MEASURE Evaluation cooperative agreement AID-OAA-L-14-00004. MEASURE Evaluation is implemented by the Carolina Population Center, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill in partnership with ICF International; John Snow, Inc.; Management Sciences for Health; Palladium; and Tulane University. The views expressed in this presentation do not necessarily reflect the views of USAID or the United States government.  
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## **ABBREVIATIONS**

GHI	Global Health Initiative
LMICs	low- and middle-income countries
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
UNC-CH	University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
USG	U.S. Government

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Country ownership in development aid assumes that with recipient countries' interest and participation, "owning" aid-funded initiatives will lead to more successful outcomes. But there is no universally accepted definition of country ownership. We conducted a systematic literature review to identify aspects of country ownership mentioned in peer-reviewed and gray literature, and identified four themes: 1) power and legitimacy; 2) commitment and responsibility 3) capacity; and 4) accountability. We also analyzed and compared similarities and differences in how different documents define these dimensions, with the results providing a framework for measuring country ownership of development initiatives. Measurement approaches must recognize that factors within and among these dimensions interact with one another in complex ways. Use of measures to identify steps toward more ownership entails conversations among stakeholders about necessary change.

## BACKGROUND

International development aid is a multibillion dollar industry. In 2011, 23 countries made available an estimated US\$133 billion for development assistance (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD], 2012). Other aid sources, such as charities and foundations, have further expanded this industry well beyond major donor governments' assistance.

In most cases, the donors want the recipients not just to receive the donation but also to “own” it; that is, to genuinely value what the donors help to establish, and to play an active role in its long-term maintenance. The idea of “country ownership” in international development assistance is not new. Donors have long expected that responsibility for the infrastructures their resources enable would eventually be assumed by the recipient country and the recipient would treat those infrastructures as their own.

In the 1980s and 1990s, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund tried to mandate country ownership, by linking the provision of financing with external experts' opinions of what is best for a particular country. However, this approach to country ownership became seen as one-sided or paternalistic. It also failed to yield the expected development outcomes, and at the close of the 1990s, the rhetoric of country ownership lost its centrality in development discourse.

Then, on March 2, 2005, 91 countries gathered in Paris to discuss international development aid. They represented both the donor and recipient communities. Interest in country ownership, with the recipients involved in setting the terms, was reignited. The participants committed to harmonize their development strategies, to use and improve country-level systems where appropriate, and to deliver and manage aid to meet development objectives.

Four years later, the Obama administration launched the Global Health Initiative (GHI), an approach to unify the international health investments of the U. S. government (USG) (GHI, 2012). Country ownership was one of the seven GHI principles. How to assess the contribution of country ownership to improved health outcomes then came under discussion.

It is within this context of foreign aid and donor/recipient relationships that we decided to explore the concepts and practices of country ownership. Currently, aid provided by foreign sources, whether bilateral (country-to-country) or multilateral (from international organizations) continues to be the primary avenue through which strategic and emergency development initiatives are funded and implemented in many low- to middle-income countries (LMICs). LMICs need the aid because of several inherent vulnerabilities: small and nondiversified economies that limit their competitiveness in the world market; natural disasters for which there is little or no resilience; and political instability stemming from civil and other wars. These vulnerabilities result in weak national systems that compromise countries' abilities to address independently the needs of their constituents.

Donor countries engage in development out of the notion that, for good or ill, all countries affect one another. For good, a wealthy country can attempt to address the abject poverty in some countries. They also engage in development to prevent the ill effects of diseases and social unrest in poor countries from spilling across their borders (Besson, 2009). Development is thus one of the three pillars of U.S. international relations; the other two are defense and diplomacy. All three of these must be practiced in the tension

between country solidarity (countries aiding one another) and country sovereignty (each country's self-determination).

Just as development aid has many dimensions, so does country ownership. Multiple definitions have been offered but each has missed key elements. We conducted a systematic literature review, specifically focusing on the funds transfer from a developed country or multilateral organization to a developing country for the purpose of rebuilding, strengthening, or maintaining systems in the developing country, in order to identify the major points of agreement and disagreement and to offer a more complete definition. From this definition, a framework for better understanding country ownership will come, which will allow more balanced interactions among donors and recipients and, therefore, more effective development outcomes.

## METHODS

We searched both the peer-reviewed literature and the so-called gray literature of lectures, conference material, technical reports, policy papers, and speeches.

Using the online library tools of the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill (UNC-CH) we searched more than 350 databases, including *PubMed*, *Web of Science*, *JSTOR Arts & Sciences Collection*, and *Wiley InterScience Journals*. To search the gray literature, we used the Google search engine with the term "country ownership." References in the material found in these searches were also scanned for additional relevant sources.

The search was conducted between January and April 2012. All publications included in the first-stage search were selected using the following criteria: the publications were scholarly publications including peer-reviewed journals (*UNC E-research tools*); were published after June 2005 in English; and provided a definition or description of "country ownership." For subsequent stages, the literature had to include a "country ownership" definition or description. Initial searches on Google Scholar found the same or similar articles to that of the e-research tool. This validated the result of the search using the UNC E-Research Tool and demonstrated that use of Google Scholar did not add value as a search method.

Articles were excluded if the discussion of country ownership was not within the context of development-supported initiatives, if development funding was of a domestic nature within a donor country (e.g., country ownership of health reform in the United States), if it was within the private sector and multinational corporations with holdings in an LMIC, or if it was of a general nature or specific to a program area other than health.

For the analysis of text, we used the template analysis approach, in which key words were identified, then grouped and coded into themes (King, 2004).

## RESULTS

Our search yielded 69 references related to country ownership (see Figure 1). Fourteen were excluded, because they did not have the word “ownership” in the title. Of the remaining 55 references, 25 were excluded, because they did not offer a definition or description of country ownership. Thus, 30 articles met our inclusion criteria. Half (15) were scholarly publications and half were gray literature. The majority (21) were published between 2007 and 2012. We identified four dominant themes of country ownership from this literature: 1) power and legitimacy, 2) commitment and responsibility, 3) capacity, and 4) accountability.

### Power and Legitimacy

A donor/recipient relationship exists in the context of development aid. Khan (2001) described this relationship as a principal-agent relationship. This relationship is governed by a power dynamic where the donor’s power is seen as constructive (power to act) and the recipient’s power is seen as controlling (power over a player or process) (Hyden, 2008). Humanitarian and utilitarian motives mean the donor relies on the recipient to accomplish predetermined objectives and the recipient receives resources because it is unable to provide these for itself (Khan, 2001).

The concept of country ownership is an inherently political concept (Besson, 2009; Booth, 2011). Besson (2009) argued that both the donor and the recipient should exercise the power to define and the power over defining the development and decision-making processes, prioritizing interests and determining how initiatives will be implemented and in what direction. However, this power relationship is unequal. The social and political interests of both parties are often different and power tends to be controlled by the party that is the source of resources. Or, as Carlos Diaz-Alejandro, prominent Columbia University professor of economics, said, “If you ask for a gift, you must listen to your patron” (Khan, 2001).

The 2005 Paris Declaration called on donors to commit to respect and support country ownership. This document assumed that the donor would respect the direction of the recipient country (de Renzio, 2008), listen to the priorities of governments, assist governments to achieve those priorities, and allow governments to make mistakes (Whitfield, 2009). Within this flexibility and innovation, donors must also be willing to withdraw aid when the direction and processes are inconsistent with what the donor is willing to support (Whitfield, 2009). Best (2007) referred to this as “political pluralism,” the idea that there is more than one way to achieve development, that people should have the opportunity to debate those alternatives, and that the one best solution does not have to be determined by the donor.

Concurrently, recipient countries must have the power to “exert meaningful control over their decisions and actions” (Best, 2007). That is, they must have authority. Because, as Besson and Booth posit, ownership is a political concept, the recipient must be the legitimate voice of the country and for whom national development is a key objective (Besson, 2009; Booth, 2011). The recipient must have the right and the space to set its own development agenda and create strategies and programs to meet the objectives of that agenda (Ghebreyesus, 2010; Rogerson, 2005). Without this legitimacy, governments will be unable to engender and sustain support. Instead, they may have to resort to other forms of power, such as force or coercion, which may achieve a “modest degree of implementation in the face of sabotage, indifference, nonparticipation, and minimum effort and compliance from the general population, despite large expenditure of resources” (Johnson, 2005).

The issue of legitimacy in this power dynamic is twofold: (1) Legitimacy (perceived or actual) in a recipient country acts as an internal social control as the citizens of the country believe that the government acts without coercion (Johnson, 2005). (2) Legitimacy provides external assurance that development goals negotiated with donors will be met (Best, 2007). On the part of the donor, there must be the perception that the expertise behind negotiated programs is legitimate, or as Best (2007) argues, “its authority is perceived to be justified.” Also, there must be the perception that the donor is providing objective solutions to problems that the country is seeking to resolve (Best, 2007).

In the context of country ownership, the power that both donor and recipient possess in this relationship is tempered by a partnership arrangement. In this partnership, the donor’s power serves to enable the objectives of the recipient, not treat them as the “means” or the “instrument” to achieve development results (European Center for Development Policy Management, 2011). This, in turn, meets the objectives of the donor, because these objectives are aligned with those of the recipients (Hyden, 2008).

## **Commitment and Responsibility**

The most emphatic value in the Paris and Accra<sup>1</sup> Declarations was the idea of “commitment.” The term was used more than 30 times in the document, to denote the obligation of donors and recipients alike to engage in the process of aid effectiveness. The declarations called on donors to respect and strengthen country leadership, and on recipients to develop and implement their own national strategies in response to identified and prioritized national needs (OECD, 2005 & 2008).

Castel-Branco (2008) reasoned that natural links exist among commitment, leadership, and control. Ownership in its purest sense means the recipient formulates development agendas free from the influence of the donor and the donor finances that agenda, even if its policy preferences are not aligned. Admitting that this purist perspective is “unrealistic,” Castel-Branco (2008) contended that the other end of the spectrum is also undesirable. He advocated emphasis on the substance rather than the form of the ownership—that there should be recipient country commitment to, leadership of, and control over the development goals, programs, and processes to reach those goals. In this way, “ownership reinforces commitment, and commitment in turn yields results and assures long-term sustainability” (Ghebreyesus, 2010).

With this commitment or right to set the agenda comes a responsibility. Johnson (2005) states that if a country has the right to insist on deciding its own development agenda without coercion, then it is also obliged to take full responsibility for the outcomes that result from policy and program implementation. In other words, recipients should take responsibility to “do or fail to do” (Molund, 2000). They should take responsibility for setting the agenda, designing the programs, engaging the partners, managing the overall process, and accounting for results (Buiter, 2007; Health Systems 20/20, 2012).

Whitfield (2009) introduced the idea of “ownership as control.” Control can be assessed by observing “what proportion of the implemented policy agenda was decided by the government; what proportion resulted from a compromise between recipient and donor; and what proportion was accepted reluctantly as a necessary price to pay for accessing financial aid” (Whitfield, 2009). She states further that achieving ownership as control depends on how the two countries share power.

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<sup>1</sup> Held in 2008 as a follow-up to the meeting held in Paris in 2005.

Molund (2000) presented a legal definition of ownership as the right of use, control, and transfer. He argues that in addition to these objective criteria, there are also subjective criteria of necessary “attitudes, feelings and opinions.” Boughton (2002) states that though the “state of mind” and “internal commitment” of the national stakeholders are important, and that inferences can be drawn from observed behavior, there is no way to observe this directly and any evidence would be incomplete. While not dismissing these more subjective concepts, Boughton suggests that more practical signs of commitment can be found in greater control given by the donors to recipients over the development agenda in a relationship of trust and empowerment.

## Capacity

If a recipient is to lead the determination of its policy direction, gain and sustain the trust of its donors, and take responsibility for processes and outcomes, and if donors are to achieve their development goals, then the recipient must have the capacity to do these things (Best, 2007). The recipient “should have the institutional capacity to develop strategies and operational plans, coordinate and align the activities of key stakeholders, implement programs or delegate their implementation to others and provide oversight and hold implementers accountable” (Health Systems 20/20, 2012).

Institutional capacity is a complex notion. It involves multiple actors, multiple dimensions, and multiple levels. In simple terms, capacity “represents the potential for using resources effectively and maintaining gains in performance with gradually reduced levels of external support” (LaFond, et al., 2003). This definition points to two components: existing capacity and a capacity gap that needs building; it assumes an internal process that is enhanced or accelerated by an external source (Goldberg, 2012).

There is also a “capacity dilemma” at play in the donor/recipient relationship (Best, 2007). Recipients who possess the required level of capacity to engage in true ownership are least likely to need donor assistance, and the recipients for whom leadership, power, authority, and engendering respect will be a challenge are the ones most in need of donor assistance and for whom achieving ownership of programs and initiatives would be a valuable goal (Best, 2007).

Within this capacity dimension, there is a role for the donor in recognizing existing capacity, working with recipients to identify areas for improvement or strengthening, and integrating donor-supported capacity building and programs with institutional structures and processes (Atun, 2009; de Renzio, 2008). Donors themselves grapple with capacity issues. Structural limitations, such as staff turnover and lack of delegation from respective headquarters or the way they deploy their resources, constrain attempts to contribute to capacity development (Wood, 2008). But it is also important for the donor to recognize that capacity building requires substantial investment—more than the usual five years—from a sustained source (InterAction, 2011; Mas de Xaxas, 2007).

Sridhar (2009) contends that donors should help recipients find sustainable solutions to their identified needs and resist developing parallel systems that neglect and further weaken already-weak systems. The expediency of “quick wins” must be replaced by “long-term priority setting and planning” (Sridhar, 2009).

Recipients continue to be challenged both by real and perceived capacity constraints and by the tension between dedicated systems to address the demands of ownership and the need to integrate or “mainstream”

vertical programming in existing systems (Wood, et al., 2008). Therefore, recipients must be flexible in adjusting their national and subnational structures, be open to alliances and partnerships from civil society and the private sector, and be inclusive in their planning and oversight processes (Atun, 2009; Mas de Xaxas, 2007).

Hauck, et al. (2011) argue that capacity building and ownership are cyclical, self-perpetuating elements. Ownership is integral to creating functional and well-performing systems, organizations, and individuals by placing them in a constant state of interaction, and this growing capacity in turn strengthens commitment and responsibility for outcomes—two central tenets of ownership.

## **Accountability**

Accountability is based on a power dynamic in which an agent reports to a principal on his or her activities and faces consequences for noncompliance. Easterly (2010) and Sridhar (2009) state that in this relationship, those with power are not accountable to those with less power. The Paris and Accra declarations used the term “mutual accountability” to describe the joint obligation that both the recipient and the donor share in the development process. This contemporary view of mutual accountability assumes a more equal balance of power. It entails an agreement between recipients and donors that is manifested through a sound accountability mechanism, including results-based frameworks “premised on clear outcome targets that must be defined and agreed to at the outset” (Ghebreyesus, 2010).

Additionally, Boothe (2011) and InterAction (2011) believe the donor should provide information on its plans, programs, and aid flows to all partners in-country. Further, recipients must be open to sharing their national budgets as they relate to counterpart funding for development initiatives. This allows an enhanced parliamentary role in developing and accounting for strategies and budgets (Wood, 2008).

Boerma, et al. note a trend toward greater demands for accountability. The challenges of mutual accountability are to ensure that the accountability mechanisms implemented in the recipient country serve the purposes of that country and not just external accountability (Holzscheiter, 2012) and also to ensure that not only governments but civil society and other nongovernmental actors are involved in these accountability structures, so that accountability and ownership are “mutually reinforcing values” (Germain, 2011; Wright, 2008).

## **DISCUSSION**

This literature review demonstrates that country ownership is both an essential component of the development process and a constructed outcome. The idea of country ownership—expressed as it should be, not as it is—seeks optimal behaviors and conditions in a donor/recipient relationship. This literature review does not seek to conclude that the donor/recipient relationship is a positive or negative one. The question is, what are the norms, behaviors, and inputs that will allow successful and perhaps sustainable development outcomes to be achieved, without querying the virtues of the relationship or the value of development aid? It has long been believed that country ownership is critical for a successful development result.

Missing from the literature, however, are the voices of the two major characters in this relationship: the donors and the recipients. Apart from the Paris and Accra declarations, our search did not unearth any donor policies, papers, speech transcripts, or conference presentations. It is unclear whether this absence is due to a lack of public access to these documents, whether there is a dearth of individual donor material on the issue of country ownership, or if the documents and comments coming from forums such as the Paris and Accra high-level meetings present the agreed-upon and aligned donors' voice, obviating the need to articulate individual perspectives. Alternatively, our inclusion criterion may have been too narrow to capture these additional sources.

A topic missing from the articles on country ownership was the financial aspects of ownership. None of the authors mentioned recipients' long-term ability to provide products or processes for themselves, independent of donor assistance. Yet financial transition is the essence of development aid, and is expressed in the Chinese proverb, "Give a man a fish and you feed him for a day. Teach a man to fish and you feed him for a lifetime."

The silence on this topic in the literature is puzzling. It is discussed somewhere, as is evident in recent initiatives such as "USAID Forward," the development agenda of the U.S. Agency for International Development, which seeks to identify recipient country resources for ongoing development initiatives. Potentially, then, financial transitions are discussed under rubrics other than ownership, and thus fell outside of our search and were not captured.

## **Lingering Questions about the Dimensions**

The dimensions of country ownership that we identified each entails a number of questions to be addressed if we are to enhance our understanding and the achievement of sustainability goals.

With the notion of power come questions about control: who has it and who doesn't? In the context of country ownership, what is the optimal balance of power? How does power become more balanced in this relationship? Is it realistic to expect power sharing in a relationship defined by power differences? But can ownership be said to exist if the recipient does not exercise power over the process? Can a recipient "own" an initiative if it is not the legitimate representative of the target constituency? Does country ownership exist if the donor does not demonstrate respect for a recipient's leadership, priorities, and systems?

Although this theme of power and legitimacy seemed to generate more questions than it answered, the answers form the crux of the concept of country ownership. To seek greater aid effectiveness and more sustainable outcomes, donor and recipients alike articulated through the Paris Declaration a new paradigm of development—a new relationship. This paradigm recognizes the power of donors but also the right of legitimate recipients and attempts to define the parameters for engagement in this relationship. Johnson (2005) argues that recipients must have a vision for the country that the donors "buy into" and they must be responsible for the successful or failed outcomes of development processes and products. As there are many development products and processes that can be "owned," so too can there be many ownership levels or layers. A recipient may only be interested in a product. Does the recipient also have to own the process of developing this product? For example, if a country is interested in a large demographic health study, does it need to commit to and take responsibility for the process when there is no comparable capacity to oversee and manage it? How about when there is no idea if the study will be repeated or if it will be a single activity?

Can the recipient trust the funding partner to undertake the process but still commit to using or “owning” the results from the study?

These questions suggest that not all development processes and products need to be sustainably “owned.” Perhaps some processes and products need only to be owned for a point in time and then not again. Therefore, commitment and responsibility are not static concepts but dynamic and appropriate to the initiative. Moreover, the capacity involved in ownership depends on the product being owned and stages and necessary inputs in the process. For example, a process may involve the recipient having the capacity to assess the situation in a country and develop a vision for change; lead and negotiate the aid package terms; and have technical capacity to manage and implement an initiative and the ability to funnel the results, if necessary, back into national processes. Or an initiative may simply require the recipient’s will and commitment, while the donor builds capacity for future implementation by the recipient. Therefore, some capacity may be needed for ownership to thrive, and the ownership process may result in capacity development.

However, capacity is not one-sided. The donor’s capacity is important in three ways: (1) the donor must have the ability to scan the national environment and align its global objectives with national priorities in a way that is helpful and does not disrupt or distort national goals (Sridhar, 2009); (2) the donor must be able to provide the resources needed to accomplish what it has agreed with the recipient to undertake; and (3) the donor must have the ability to deliver those resources through adequately staffed offices and appropriate procurement systems that are attentive to national development processes (Sridhar, 2009). Therefore, “successful country-owned capacity building projects echo the importance of inclusiveness in the planning process and excellent working relationships between partner/donor organizations that produce true partnerships” (Goldberg, 2012, pg. 3).

Accountability is also multifaceted. Its context is power dynamics; many times a donor country’s accountability to its citizens is at odds with the recipient government’s accountability to its citizens. The challenge, therefore, continues to be how to address this issue of accountability’s divergent purpose in an inherently imbalanced relationship.

## **Another Attempt at Defining Country Ownership**

The USG, under the GHI, produced the *Interagency Paper on Country Ownership* (USG, 2012). The genesis of the concepts in the paper is not publicly shared. However, the paper’s stated purpose is to “provide a common understanding for accelerating country ownership and sustainability in all health programs that the U.S. government supports as part of its public health and broader development agenda.” We note that the USG’s efforts to understand and describe country ownership were undertaken concurrently with our efforts; therefore, our definition is not intended to counter the USG’s definition, but rather was an independent attempt at the same task.

There are some similarities between the USG’s description and the description that emerged from this literature review. The USG interagency paper also identifies four dimensions: 1) political leadership and stewardship, 2) institutional and community ownership, 3) capabilities, and 4) mutual accountability. The USG paper describes the first two dimensions as political and institutional ownership, and therefore divides ownership by levels in the health system and the actors at those levels. The first two dimensions outlined in this paper—power legitimacy and respect, and commitment and responsibility—describe agenda setting and outline the parameters for engagement in a relationship defined by power and dedication to and roles for

addressing nationally identified needs. Descriptions of the remaining two dimensions in the USG paper and our review are similar. Yet, while descriptions of the first two dimensions in both allude to the leadership that a recipient country should take in owning a donor funding initiative, they differ on what elements of leadership are critical to ownership and how these are described.

The USG discussion of country ownership begs the question: ownership of what? The definition assumes that all funded health programs can and should be owned by recipients. But is this assumption correct? We argue that there may be instances when what is funded does not need to be “owned.”

The USG interagency paper discusses an idea termed “transition towards country ownership” and talks about a “purposeful shift from a USG-led and funded program to an integrated and country-led program.” Our paper, by contrast, does not discuss country ownership as a dichotomous concept. The dimensions discussed in this paper demonstrate that some level of country ownership usually exists. There is usually some participation by a recipient government in a donor/recipient partnership arrangement. A role for the recipient government is usually outlined and some capacity, no matter how rudimentary, is usually in place to take responsibility for infrastructure and structures for data and information flows. Therefore this paper speaks of enhancing or improving the levels of country leadership and management of the donor-funded initiative in order to achieve better outcomes.

The USG paper defines and discusses country ownership as a one-sided concept. It includes aspects of the dimensions we identified in our review but articulates those same dimensions as recipients’ roles, responsibilities, and purview. It discusses the USG’s role as “promoting,” “accelerating,” and “enhancing” country ownership. These are important advocacy activities, but the USG paper is silent on the duality of responsibility.

## **Shifting Terms**

Country ownership is an idea that endures in development rhetoric. There are logical and almost inextricable links among country ownership, development financing, technical assistance, and successful outcomes of initiatives.

However, the dual roles for the donor and recipient make the term “country ownership” a misnomer. Power has to be shared; the perception of legitimacy and the attitude of respect have to be held by both donor and recipient; commitment, responsibility, capacity and accountability are mutual. Therefore, a more accurate term would point to both donor and recipient. The term “countries’ ownership” is awkward, and the term “ownership” alone is devoid of context.

Since we began our review, the USG has moved away from the term “country ownership” to “country-led partnerships.” This change reflects (1) the complexity of the topic and the challenge of identifying a term that captures it accurately, (2) a greater emphasis on the mutuality of roles between the donor and the recipient, and (3) continued evolution in thinking about the donor/recipient relationship and how it achieves development outcomes. We believe the dimensions we identified remain applicable to the new term.

## NEXT STEPS

Country ownership is an intuitive and valuable principle. It is a USG priority, as indicated by its presence among the GHI principles. But it remains to be seen whether the USG's definition of the principle or its priority among U.S. bilateral initiatives will be sustained. A few years after it was introduced, the term "country ownership" was replaced in USAID-initiated public discussions with the term "country-led partnerships." Also since its introduction, there have been changes in leadership positions, including the Global AIDS Coordinator, also known as the AIDS Ambassador, and the USAID Administrator. Implementation of a far-reaching principle such as country ownership requires aggressive support from the highest levels of government.

We believe the description of country ownership presented in this paper will serve as a milestone, if not the final destination, in our understanding of the principle. It will enable evaluation of the degree to which the principle, by one definition, is being implemented, and serve as a baseline to assess how the definition changes over time.

**Table 1. Summary of the subcomponents of the prominent elements of country ownership, and the sources in which they are mentioned.**

Theme	Brief Description	Subcomponents	References
Power and legitimacy	Country governments have the power and legitimacy (right) to set priorities and make decisions that are respected by the donors.	Recipients are the entities that can legitimately lead the country ownership process	OECD, 2005 Best, 2007 Castel-Branco, 2008 de Renzio, 2008 Johnson, 2005 Khan, 2001 Whitfield, 2009 Besson, 2009 Ghebreyesus, 2010 Roderson, 2005
		Other national actors (e.g., civil society) should participate but leadership and decision making comes from government.	OECD, 2005 Best, 2007 Castel-Branco, 2008 Johnson, 2005 Whitfield, 2009
		Donors use national processes to implement aid-funded programs. Where national processes do not exist, they confer with governments on programs to be implemented.	OECD, 2005 Castel-Branco, 2008 Johnson, 2005 Whitfield, 2009
Commitment and responsibility	Political stakeholders commit to take responsibility for aid funded programs that address an identified need.	Recipients take responsibility for successes and failures of funded programs.	Castel-Branco, 2008 Johnson, 2005 Khan, 2001 Ghebreyesus, 2010 Molund, 2000 Buiter, 2007 Heath Systems 20/20, 2012 Boughton, 2002

Theme	Brief Description	Subcomponents	References
		Funded programs are based on agreed, identified national needs.	OECD, 2005 Castel-Branco, 2008 de Renzio, 2008 Johnson, 2005 Khan, 2001 Whitfield, 2009 Drazen, 2002 Hyden, 2011
Capacity	Donors and recipients have the capacity to sustain initiatives and programs.	Recipients have the necessary individual, organizational, and systemic capacity to undertake development programs.	Best, 2007 Buiter, 2007 Johnson, 2005 Heath Systems 20/20, 2012 Goldberg, 2012 Hauck, 2011
		Donors have the capacity to support countries.	Wood, 2008 Srihar, 2009 Atun, 2009 de Renzio, 2008 InterAction, 2011 Mas de Xaxas, 2007
Accountability	Recipients and donors are accountable to each other and to their citizens for programs, systems, and strategies.	Data are appropriate to national settings and are reliable	Khan, 2001 Hauck, 2011 Holzscheiter, 2012
		Data management systems collect, report, and use data.	Khan, 2001 Hauck, 2011 Boerma, 2007
		Results are shared with national and international stakeholders.	OECD, 2005 Khan, 2001 Germain, 2011 Wright, 2008
		Donors share information on the range of their assistance with recipients.	Booth, 2011 InterAction, 2011

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This publication was produced with the support of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) under the terms of MEASURE Evaluation cooperative agreement AID-OAA-L-14-00004. MEASURE Evaluation is implemented by the Carolina Population Center, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill in partnership with ICF International; John Snow, Inc.; Management Sciences for Health; Palladium; and Tulane University. The views expressed in this presentation do not necessarily reflect the views of USAID or the United States government.

WP-16-164

